


Transforming Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations

Dr. Stuart Johnson

SSI-SWP Spring Conference

15 April 2005




Enemy Aircraft Destroyed

World War II	15,811
Korea	894
Vietnam	137
Desert Storm (+ No Fly)	38
Bosnia/Kosovo	9
Afghanistan, Iraq	0




Aircraft Sorties to Destroy a Fixed Target



World War II	1000-2000
Vietnam	20-50
Desert Storm	3-4
Kosovo, Iraq	> one target/sortie




Improved Accuracy



World War II	1,000 meters
Vietnam	120 meters
Desert Storm (Laser Guidance)	~3 meters
KOSOVO (GPS Guidance)	~3 meters



Percentage of Precision Munitions




Gulf War	7 percent
Operation Iraqi Freedom*	68 percent

*As of 4/1/03




Increase in Communications Capacity Available to the Theater Commander



Operation	Year	Megabytes/Second
Desert Storm	1991	99
OEF/OIF	2003	3,200




Major Combat Operations Have Gotten Shorter



	Duration (months)
World War II	45
Korean War	37
Vietnam	90
Desert Shield/Storm	7
Operation Enduring Freedom	3
Operation Iraqi Freedom	1




U.S. Casualties in Major Combat Operations Have Declined Sharply



OPERATION/WAR	DEATHS
World War II	405,399
Korean War	54,246
Vietnam	58,209
Desert Storm/Shield	382
Operation Enduring Freedom <i>until December 22, 2001</i>	12
Operation Iraqi Freedom <i>until April 30, 2003</i>	139



U.S. Casualties in Recent Conflicts




Operation Enduring Freedom	Killed	Wounded
Major Combat Operations	12	49
Stabilization and Reconstruction	151	246


Operation Iraqi Freedom	Killed	Wounded
Major Combat Operations	139	426
Stabilization and Reconstruction	1384	5532



The Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap – Figure 1




Traditional Model






The Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap – Figure 2




New Challenges (Preemption & RDOs)






Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap




Transformed S&R Capability (Bridge to Nation Building)





Army Forces in Iraq (1 May 2003)



Reserve Component as % of Total Force

Military Police 59%

Civil Affairs 98%

Engineers 46%

Medical 35%


PSYOP 98%



AC/RC rebalancing required



Availability of Forces (Regional and Linguistics Skills)



Army FAO resources by regional specialty are:

Latin America – 189

Europe – 195

South Asia – 35

Eurasia – 184

China – 41

North Africa/Middle East – 140



Northeast Asia – 71

Southeast Asia – 64

Sub-Saharan Africa - 83





Planning Scenarios: Distribution of Size and Likely Conditions for Scenarios







An Organization for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations






An Organization for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations






Strategic Operational Concepts



- ✓ Integrated planning of combat and S&R operations
- ✓ Concurrency of operations
- ✓ Unity of effort
- ✓ Compelling and consistent strategic message
- ✓ Improved cultural intelligence
- ✓ Early, demonstrable success in reconstruction
- ✓ Early introduction of indigenous capabilities
- ✓ Maximize Allied support early
- ✓ Modular, scalable, ready and Joint S&R capabilities
- ✓ Incorporate new technologies




Adapting the Military Culture (Required skill sets for S&R)



- Warfighting skills in case conflict escalates
- Courage to take risks
- Confidence to delegate authority & need for trust
- Decision-making skills
- Ability to adapt or adjust to new environments
- Fairness and evenhandedness
- ^ **Vision of politico-military environment**
- ^ **Ability to interact with nonmilitary partners & build consensus**
- ^ **Negotiating skills**
- ^ **Broad intellectual background (sociology, law, etc.)**
- ^ **Interpersonal skills**
- ^ **Understanding of historical/cultural contexts**
 - ^ More work needed




Technologies for S&R Operations



- Security
 - Distributed and networked surveillance sensors
 - Vehicle tagging and tracking
 - Biometrics
 - Non-lethal weapons
- Infrastructure
 - Civil infrastructure simulations
 - Infrastructure equipment (water purification, electric power)
- Human Relations
 - Mobile, real-time language translators
 - Training Tools for culture, linguistics




Army Actions that Respond to Stability Operations Requirements



- Expand number of brigades: add civil affairs, intelligence, etc. to each brigade. Modular capabilities to augment.
- Increase the numbers of civil affairs, military police, and PSYOP units in the overall (AC and RC) force. Shift from artillery/air defense. Add 30,000 troops.
- Make Task Force Commanders responsible for post-combat missions.
- National Training Center focused on stability operations, to include simulated Arab villages.
- Intensify the focus on Stability Operations in doctrine development and when harvesting Lessons Learned from current operations.
- Invest in Stability Ops capabilities: Stryker integration, body armor, armored HUMMVs) and IED countermeasures.
- Recruit Arabic speakers into the Ready Reserve.




Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study



- Need NSC-run "Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces" for top contingencies
- Treat stabilization as an explicit mission for DoD force planning
- Army should appoint senior advocate for S&R and define S&R modules below brigade level
- Army modular initiatives not enough, need JFC to experiment with new innovative concepts: task organize, new combinations
- Current pace of S&R operations will require changes in force structure: mitigation through contract personnel, technology, partners, etc
- Combatant Commander to develop intelligence campaign plans for pre and post-conflict
- Enhance tagging, tracking and locating capability




Draft Pentagon Directive



- Stability ops to be accorded priority and attention comparable to combat ops and incorporated into all phases of planning
- Units will be organized for guerilla warfare, counter-terrorism and 'pre- and post-conflict' stability ops
- Training to emphasize foreign language and regional cultural expertise
- Expanding role of intelligence gathering and analysis for "sustained coverage and deep penetration" in potential regions of instability
- Development of near term technologies to identify, track and locate potential enemies and threats
- Combatant Commanders to devote more resources to and include post-conflict operations in their war plans
- Coordination with and support other US Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs and Private Sector



Lugar-Biden Bill to Strengthen Civilian S&R Capabilities




- Creates new office at State for S&R operations (now in being)
- Creates new directorate at NSC and new interagency committee
- Adds 250 people for deployable Response Readiness Corps and more for a Response Readiness Reserve
- Provides a \$100 million contingency fund, special waivers, and personnel exchange authorities
- Develops new NDU/FSI/AWC education and training S&R programs for civilian personnel
- Need to work out command arrangements and modes of cooperation between military and civilian entities



NATO

Stabilization & Reconstruction Force



- Taken together, Allies have considerable experience and manpower for S&R operations
- But, *ready and deployable* European capabilities are stretched thin
- Organizing for Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan was ad hoc
- NATO needs to identify S&R assets and consider ways to better plan, organize and exercise for these missions
- Some Allies (Germany, Italy) favor specialized forces, others (UK, France) favor multitasking
- Partners should be involved